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The Illusion of Theoretical Purity: as it applies to managing diversity.
This paper is presented in deep appreciation of Felix Geyer, my sociocybernetic mentor. This paper developed out of my own progress from a point midway through my doctoral process until now. You will notice a critique of a portion of Geyer's work. Felix Geyer unwittingly mentored me in and into this group (WG01) by not providing a didactic response but encouraging more participation in the group process.
Defining Creative Misreading.
The term "creative misreading" used by How to define Habermas' acquisition of theory. Creative misreading distorts the reality of ideas in a particular way for the specific purpose of furthering one's own project.
Two Types of Misreadings:
Fragmenting Misreadings and Compromising Misreadings
Fragmenting Misreadings
My definition of fragmenting misreadings referes to the reader who utilizes
a segment of the theory without accepting its underlying premise.
Compromising Misreadings
I define compromising misreadings as occuring when a reader accepts the underlyuing premise of a theory but compromises the primary theory in pursuit of a workable methodology. There are two types of compromising misreadings; false and accidental.
A. False: MYTH - something that cannot be proved either true or false.
We acknowledge that misreading will occur when theory is translated
into method. One must be careful to be aware of whats' going on -
to assess whether the misreading invalidates work or not.
Compromise could indicate the need to backtrack and take another path,
or the need to adjust theory.
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Occasionally theorists appropriate selected segments of existing
theories. These parts are then tailored to fit into a proposed theory.
When this happens, the appropriated segments are no longer consistent with
the original theory from which they were excised. Tinkering with
a parent theory in this fashion has been termed creative misreadings (How,
1985). This paper begins to address the following questions: How closely
does the model adhere to the letter of the theory? or How far can the model
deviate from the theory?
Creative misreading might also uncover contradictory elements
in the borrower's own work. According to How, creative misreadings
distort the reality of ideas in a particular way for the specific purpose
of furthering one's own project (How, 1985).
Changes occur through the perception of the difference between
the theory one reads and any model deemed appropriate. In other words,
the degree of integrity depends on the difference between the theory and
the model developed for application. Recognizing the tendency to creatively
misread is a step toward bridging the gap between theory and practical
application.
Sociocybernetics is a field slowly emerging into its own.
The challenge is to set the stage for critical analysis and theoretical
advancement. Those who participate in the development of a new field
of study have the opportunity to set guidelines and develop the definition
for the field. Such freedom must be enjoyed with due caution; if
unrecognized, creative misreadings can lead to confusion among theorists
observing the fledgling discipline.
One of the problems with difficult theories
is the possibility of mis-representation. This paper serves as a
cautionary guide to those who want to avoid bending a theory to fit their
own predisposition.
A model is an essential
requirement for any utilization of theory. Without a model, theories
are useless for practical application. Even when the essence of a
theory is understood, problems arise in maintaining consistency between
theory and model. The developer of the model asks, "How closely does
this model adhere to the letter of the theory? How far can the model
deviate from the theory?"
In some cases, theorists appropriate
selected segments of existing theories. These disjointed parts are
then tailored to fit into a proposed theory. When this happens, the
appropriated segments are no longer consistent with the original theories
from which they were excised. Tinkering with a parent theory in this
fashion has been termed "creative misreadings" (How, 1985).
I identify two types of creative
misreadings. The first draws on segments of argument to support divergent
views. The second type compromises the original theoretician's assumptions
by attempting to unify divergent theories.
Interpretation attempts to discover
the author's intent. Creative misreading tailors another person's
concepts to purposes not necessarily consistent with the original intent.
This practice might also uncover contradictory elements in the borrower's
own work. According to How, creative misreadings distort the reality
of ideas in a particular way for the specific purpose of furthering one's
own project (How, 1985). This particular form of distorted communication
is not related to the practice of critique which examines a theory for
contradictions.
The expression used by How, "creative
misreading," originally referred to Habermas' habit of incorporating other
theoreticians' concepts into the construction of his conceptual developments
(La Capra, 1977; Canovan, 1983; How, 1985). I discuss the problem
of creative misreading in order to eventually develop a model to test the
validity of Luhmann's theory. I have to know to what extent I can
stretch concepts without breaking the connection and displacing the idea
from its context. In wrestling with the feasibility of using Luhmann's
theory, I found myself unwittingly misreading the meaning of one of the
key elements.
Illustration of Two Types of Creative Misreadings
Fragmenting Misreadings
My illustration for the first type of
creative misreading is from Habermas' interpretation of Luhmann's concept
of system. Habermas does not accept Luhmann's concept of the distinction
between environment and system (Holub, 1991).
Habermas does not evaluate Luhmann's
theory of differentiation in the context of the philosophical discussion
of the "death of the subject." Instead, Habermas' interpretation
insists that Luhmann simply replaces "subject" with "system," "object"
with "environment" (Habermas, 1984).
Luhmann clearly spells out how the subject
is no longer relevant to the description of the modern age (Luhmann, 1991).
The subject is fundamental to the way in which the world is perceived.
The substance from which Luhmann formulates theory is "complexity," transcending
the perceptions of the physical.
Habermas' creative misreading of Luhmann is
not in the disagreement between the two theorists but in the intrusion
of one's frame of reference into anther’s theory. Habermas critiqued
Luhmann's definition of differentiation without any consideration for the
argument that the subject is no longer appropriate to modern society.
Compromising Misreading
The second type of creative misreading
consists of difficulties encountered when a synthesis is sought between
variant theories. The reason for succumbing to this type of creative
misreading is that models are difficult to develop. Theory
is often compromised in the pursuit of a practical model. Anecdotal
accounts of problems encountered while reading theory suggest that practical
expectations are not met by theory. Problems of how one conducts empirical
research arise with Luhmann’s self-referential systems theory. I discovered
that I was not the only scholar who fell into a trap.
"Compromising creative misreading" can
either be false or accidental. My example of a false creative misreading
is Felix Geyer's (1980) application of Luhmann's work through the development
of alienation theory. The example of an accidental misreading comes
from my initial attempt to illustrate Luhmann's theory of differentiation.
Geyer took Luhmann's analysis of internal
complexity and used it to define alienation in a modern context.
However, by adding preconditions to internal complexity, Geyer reverted
to the concept of the subject to develop an alienation model. The
return to the concept of subject is a signal that a creative misreading
of Luhmann's theoretic occurred. This ‘signal’ refers to a principal
component of Luhmann’s theory.
Expanding on a shift in Luhmann's thinking regarding complexity,
Geyer elaborated on the development of the environment's internal complexity
(1980). The assertion Geyer made is that the internal complexity
of a person is built up in the course of a lifetime. Geyer attempted
to demonstrate that this accumulation is the result of the person’s goal-dependent
efforts to reduce the complexity of his environment. Because of the
preconditions Geyer delineated, the solution results in a reversion to
the input/output model. Input/output models are the children of an
equilibrium systems approach grounded on fluid dynamic principles.
Geyer obviously drew heavily on Luhmann’s concept of internal complexity.
Luhmann defined the input/output schema as a restrictive description on
the relations between system and environment (personal communication, September
20, 1996). The restriction is limited to social systems that have
fixed input and output goals. The problem I have with Geyer’s input/output
model is that I do not believe the model meets the restricted qualifications.
I can only speculate that Geyer chose
this path because of difficulties he found in the use of Luhmann's concepts
of elemental reproduction and self-identification. Since Luhmann's
subject-free concept eliminates any input/output models, this prompts an
alert to a potential creative misreading.
At this juncture in my understanding
of Luhmann, I label Geyer's reading of Luhmann as an example of a false
creative misreading. As the observer of this false misreading, I
temper future judgment of Geyer's application of Luhmann's theory in the
light of the possibility that Luhmann may acknowledge certain exceptions.
In other words, at some point Luhmann might clarify with a response to
the question: In order to apply Luhmann's theory to a working model,
what latitude can be given to the input/output schema? In this case,
and in others similar, what is now a false misreading may lead to future
resolutions. As such, the original misreading is transformed into
a critique.
The next example illustrates how I acquired
understanding of an element of Luhmann's conceptual world. The expression
"accidental misreading" refers to my initial illustration of Luhmann's
theory. The motivation for my initial reading of Luhmann came from
a dissatisfaction with Habermas. Although Habermas' communicative
action disappointed me, his influence continued to guide my interpretation
of Luhmann's theory of differentiation. The difference between the
two theorists that affected me most was Habermas' inability to accept Luhmann's
ideas on the distinction made between environment and system.
My introduction to Luhmann occurred
in the context of an immersion in the theory of communicative action.
Initially, I resolved Habermas' objections to the definition of differentiation
by relegating "language" to the realm of what Luhmann defines as environment.
Because of an interest in dialogue and the interaction between conversationalists,
I knew that Habermas saw language as the medium for reaching an understanding
of one's lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). In an attempt to demonstrate
the distinction made between environment and system and to be consistent
with Habermas' lifeworld concept, I inadvertently misread Luhmann.
By falsely labeling "language" as environment, I violated the integrity
of Luhmann's subject-free concept. The discovery of my accidental
misreading followed further study into Luhmann's development of a subject-free
concept.
These categories of creative misreadings
are not necessarily permanent. As one continues to read theory and
develop practical models based on those theories, knowledge evolves.
The reader's perspective changes through perception of the difference between
the theory read and the model in progress. In other words, the degree
of integrity depends on the difference between the theory and the model
developed for application. The recognition of the tendency to creatively
misread theory is a step toward bridging the gap between theory and practical
application.
From Creative Misreading to Innovation:
My work with non-immediacy that changes into speculation of differentiation.
When I first started to develop my dissertation idea, I was a student
of Habermas’ work.
The dissertation concept began with my attempt to explain an unusual
grammatical usage of the passive voice in conversations between AIDS patients
and their physicians.
I studied the passive voice and its usage in the English language. A
specialty area in
linguistics eventually led me to ergative languages and cognitive grammar.
Upon finishing this specialty area, I had to decide whether to follow the
communicative action explanation or to search for other possible theoretical
explanations. My mentor recommended that I begin a study of Niklas Luhmann’s
systems theory. I found that if I continued my dissertation work using
communicative action, the solution to the linguistic problem was non-immediacy
(Mehrabian, A., Wiener, M., 1966). This possibility never convinced me
that it was an accurate tool to understand the dialogue between patient
and physician. This was especially evident after I had studied the dialogues
in the context of cognitive linguistics (Langacker, R.W., 1991).
Non-immediacy depends heavily on the subject which binds one to the physical
world. Luhmann’s definitions transcend perceptions of the physical. In
the case of physician-patient dialogue, the participants move through time
rather than the subject moving through time. Non-immediacy by definition
cannot be applied in the study of such an event.
Equipped with my knowledge of ergative languages, Langacker’s cognitive
grammar, and Luhmann’s definition of differentiation, I examined the conversations
between AIDS patients and their physicians from a new focus.
Problem:
Since all my committee members were familiar with Habermas, I spent
most of my time and effort explaining and interpreting Luhmann’s work and
therefore the concept of the subject became the central focus. For a while
most of my energy went into making Luhmann’s concepts compatible with Habermas
or at least trying to reconcile their differences. Actually at this point
I was developing empirical linguistic data to prove or disprove my thesis
of non-immediacy. One night, I stopped and realized that I was not illustrating
Luhmann’s definition of differentiation but rather committing a "creative
misreading" of his work. I have to confess that many members of my committee,
including my external reader, would not have objected to continuing my
"creative misreading."
Question:
Are creative misreadings part of the evolutionary process of theory building?
Creative misreadings are different than arguments with theorists’ concepts. The idea comes from the realm of theory, not application, and relates to philosophy rather than methodology. Theorists creatively misread when they are familiar with the work in question. It is based on intent, not ignorance. Creative misreading distorts the reality of ideas in a particular way for the specific purpose of furthering one's own project
Possibilities:
Purity is a concept that implies that an object or concept is true to itself, and acts according to expectations. To be pure does not imply practical use, but is a quality. To illustrate this further, absolutely pure water will not freeze. The impurities in water allow ice to form. Another example is the need for raindrops to form around dust particles; rain will not fall from perfectly pure air.
There is a necessity for the development of knowledge that originates from theoretical thought. No theory is truly useful by itself, but the applications derived by those who are inspired by it can have worldwide resonance. Theory isn’t ultimately designed as practical.
According to a communication from Wolfgang Walter (1998), he states that theories of how society is constructed cannot be conserved or destroyed. Validity is either preserved or lost; validity is produced by one’s understanding of Luhmann’s theory through scientific communication or some prescribed format. If it goes beyond methodological application, it may be destroyed. The greatest danger to the integrity of a theory is the use of a theory to gain information. A major problem with the idea of creative misreading is that one has arrived at a decision concerning the applicability of a theoretical construct. The danger that a creative misreading poses is that it would establish a static standard from which other formulations are made. The value of creative misreading is in its transient and ever-evolving nature that may at one time expose a fault and at another reveal an innovation.
Peter Fuchs (1998) adds that applications can’t simply fit back into the theory from which they were extracted. The idea of application is not linear, but more complex - with nested hierarchies and strange loops - an evolution of theory which can’t be duplicated outside of its specific time and place. As theory is linked with practical application, the theory doesn’t change but the applications do, depending on the circumstances of time and place.
Small impurities lend themselves to functioning theory - large
ones transform a theory into something completely at odds with the creator’s
original intent – moisture and dust produce rain, moisture and dirt produce
mud
Conclusion:
A theorist may be so eager to apply and understand - to make oneself
known or to solve a problem - that means are selected and stretched out
of shape. Careful thought sometimes goes out the window when seeking to
make everything fit, and things are all seen in the light of one’s current
perspective. Habermas’ tunnel vision caused him to strain to find
proof for his theory and overlook the real value of Luhmann’s work.
Creative misreadings taken in the tradition of Luhmann’s theory of differentiation
means that the degree of integrity depends on the difference between the
theory and the model developed for application. Going beyond a Habermasian
perspective and recognizing the tendency to creatively misread is a step
toward bridging the gap between consistent theory and practical application.
[Return to beginning]
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